defense within the home. Accordingly, the Court went on to strike down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of hand guns and that also required lawfully owned firearms to be kept unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. Justice Scalia's opinion engages in a protracted survey of historical materials in an attempt to ascertain the original understanding of the Second Amendment, which was enacted in 1791. After analyzing the historical materials, Justice Scalia concludes that while the purpose of "codifying" the right to bear arms as a constitutional provision was to ensure the preservation a well-regulated militia, this does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the right to bear arms; "most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting." 4 As Justice Scalia reads history, it is individual self-defense that is the "central component" of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. 5 Although admitting that the right to bear arms is not unlimited, Justice Scalia again turns to history, at this point to determine the permissible limits that may be placed on the right to bear arms. 6 He explicitly rejects use of a test that would balance the competing interests in the case and flatly refuses to consider any empirical evidence that shows the need to regulate handgun violence. 7 The
Second Amendment, Scalia proclaims, "elevates above all other interests the right of right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." 8 4 Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2801. 5 Id. (Emphasis in original.) See also, id. at 2797: "Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." 6 Id. at 2816-17. 7 Id. at 2821. 8 Id.
Justice Stevens entered a dissenting opinion in Heller taking strong exception to Justice Scalia's historical analysis. Engaging in his own extensive examination of the historical record concerning the Second Amendment, Justice Stevens concluded, in contradistinction to Justice Scalia, that the Amendment protects the individual right to bear arms only in connection with military service and does not limit the authority of the government to regulate the nonmilitary use or possession of firearms. 9 As Justice Stevens sees it, the preamble to the Second Amendment clearly states that the purpose of the Amendment is to protect the right of the people of each of the several states to maintain a well-regulated militia. 10 Moreover, Stevens believes that the historical record emphatically confirms that "the Framers' single-minded focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee 'to keep and bear arms' was on military uses of firearms, which All of this, of course, begs the question by assuming that the Second Amendment must be interpreted according to its original meaning. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opinion, the constitutional right that the Court announced in its opinion was not "enshrined" in the Second Amendment by the Framers; rather, it was set forth by the Court itself in a groundbreaking decision investing the Second Amendment with meaning that was not previously realized. For all his love of history, however, Justice Scalia seems to be unaware of the complexities of historical research. It is a mistake to think that the original meaning of the Constitution is an existential "thing" waiting to be unearthed from old records and documents. 30 As any good historian knows, interpretation of the past entails considerably more than rummaging around in old archives to find hidden materials. The historian sees things from a particular point of view, according to a particular value system. So, the historical approach still leaves the Supreme Court with the sort of discretion that Justice Scalia so disdains.
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While the open-endedness of history should not be enough to scare the Court away from historical analysis of the Constitution, the Court should understand that the meaning of the Constitution is not fixed in history (or anywhere else, for that matter) and waiting to be found. Indeed, as Erwin Chemerinsky points out:
It is misguided and undesirable to search for a theory of constitutional interpretation that will yield determinate results, right and wrong answers, to most constitutional questions. No such theory exists or ever will exist. Justice Brennan once observed that "the great genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and needs." 43 Therefore, he maintained, whatever the Constitution may have meant in the past should not be the 43 
III. The Rejection of Balancing
After concluding that the Second Amendment does protect an individual right to possess firearms unconnected with service in a militia, Justice Scalia allowed that the right secured by the Second Amendment, like most rights, was not unlimited. 50 From
Blackstone through 19 th -century cases, he noted, both courts and commentators explained that the right was "not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose." 51 To determine what limits may be placed on the right to bear arms, Justice Scalia again turned to history, noting with approval that the 48 In rejecting the state's assertion that the law was a permissible health measure designed to protect the wellbeing of bakers, the Court declared that it was commonly understood that the trade of a baker has never been understood as an unhealthy one. 55 In both
Lochner and Heller, the Court erects categories to delineate the scope of a constitutional right and the authority of the state to enact laws that limit the right. In Lochner the category was based on "common understanding," while in Heller it is based on common usage. In either case, the Court sets forth formal categories that function to define the meaning of the Constitution. 52 Id. at 2817. 53 Id. In fact, Justice Scalia's opinion acknowledges the serious problem of handgun violence in the nation, but asserts that the Second Amendment "necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table," thus precluding laws that prohibit possession of handguns that may be used for self-defense in the home. 56 As Justice Scalia sees it, the Second Amendment precludes balancing because it "elevates above all other interests the right of right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." 57 Hence, the opinion flatly refuses to take a balancing approach to determine the 56 Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2822. 57 Id. at 2821.
permissible limitations that may be placed on the right to bear arms. 58 Justice Scalia explicitly rejects the possibility of balancing and is sharply critical of its use.
Regarding balancing, Justice Scalia states that he "know(s) no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 'interestbalancing' approach." He insists that "constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad." Hence, the Court "would not apply an 'interest-balancing' approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neoNazi march through Skokie."
This simply is incorrect. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has continuously shaped and re-shaped the scope of constitutional rights, including permissible to regulate speech that may incite unlawful conduct. 61 In 1939, in striking down an ordinance that prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the ground that it violated the First Amendment, the Court explained that "the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weight the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of regulation." 62 As a general matter, content-based regulations of speech are subject to a strict scrutiny balancing test that asks whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. tend to be artificial, arbitrary, and irrational. 68 As a result, rules are highly susceptible to manipulation. 69 The "anchor" or certainty they provide can be illusory, liable to shatter at the slightest tremor. Although balancing may be open-ended, nonetheless it is decidedly more circumspect than the formalism of a rule-oriented approach. In contrast to rules, balancing is realistic and purposive, two qualities that make for more genuine certainty than the shell game of formal rules.
In Heller, Justice Scalia deprecates Justice Breyer for using a "judgeempowering" balancing test, implying, of course, that balancing unduly expands judicial discretion. In response, Justice Breyer notes that balancing is an approach that the Court has taken in other areas of constitutional law. 70 Indeed, balancing is used in many other areas of constitutional law to the extent that in modern times it has become the dominant judicial method of constitutional interpretation. 71 Justice Breyer also explains that while balancing does require judgment, the nature of the balancing process circumscribes judicial discretion by requiring careful identification of the relevant interests and an evaluation of the law's effect upon them. 72 This limits the choices that a judge may make and affords transparency that lays bare the judge's reasoning for all to see and to criticize. 73 It is only through balancing-that is, what Justice Breyer describes as the exercise of "judicial judgment" 74 -that the Constitution can be interpreted in a purposive way that brings rationality to constitutional interpretation . While originalism glosses over the policy questions generated by constitutional adjudication, balancing attempts to answer them through the exercise of reasoned judgment.
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IV. Conclusion
Originalism does not eliminate the necessity of making value judgments to interpret the Constitution. Instead, it obscures the policy-making aspect of constitutional interpretation by pretending that the meaning of constitutional provisions can be recovered from historical annals. We have seen, however, that the meaning of the Constitution does not reside in history and that when judges engage in originalist interpretation they recreate the past according to their own values. 76 The interpretation of history is a complicated exercise that leaves a good deal of room for the historian to make value judgments. The historian "is committed to a doomed enterprise-the quest for an unattainable objectivity." 77 Historical analysis is a selective enterprise through which a judge imagines the past and thereby shapes it according to his or her personal vision of reality. Justice Scalia's historical approach, then, implicates the same trait that Scalia himself finds so insufferable about balancing: it invests judges with discretion to read their own values into the Constitution. Moreover, the historical approach is more insidious than balancing, because it sneaks a judge's personal views into the Constitution by denying their true nature and pretending they are nothing more than the original understanding of the document. Originalism offers an illusion of objectivity by holding out the false hope that the meaning of the Constitution exists somewhere in the past.
Originalism can be a risky enterprise for judges prone to self-deception. In searching the historical record for original meaning, there is often a temptation to discover what one wants to discover. 78 A judge may think that he or she is finding the original understanding of a constitutional text, when in truth it is the judge's own beliefs that are being revealed. Earlier originalists, purportedly searching for the intent of the framers of the Constitution, were prone to this failing 79 and later-day originalists have not been immune from it, either, as shown so pointedly in the "shamelessly selective"
reading of the historical record to which both Justices Scalia and Stevens fall prey in
Heller.
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Practitioners of originalism also have been accused of abandoning their originalist principles when it when it suits their political purposes to do so. 81 William Marshall asserts that in a number of instances originalists can be seen ignoring the historical record when it conflicts with their political agenda. 82 He concludes that originalism often devolves into "a doctrine only of convenience and not of principle."
